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Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of
the Russian Federation
LOUK HAGENDOORN, EDWIN POPPE & ANCA MINESCU
Abstract
This study examines popular support for separatism among Russians and non-Russian titular
nationalities (titulars) in 10 ethnic republics of the Russian Federation: Karelia, Komi, Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Adygea, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha-Yakutia and Tuva. A
survey was carried out in the urban regions of these republics in 1999 and 2000 in which 5,233 Russians
and 4,703 titulars participated. We found that perceived negative inter-group relations signiﬁcantly
contribute to support for separatism among titulars, but reduce support for separatism by Russians. In
contrast, indicators of prosperity of the republic and prior separatist elite-activism predict support for
separatism among both titulars and Russians.
OBSERVERS AND SCHOLARS HAVE WONDERED WHY THE COLLAPSE of the multi-
ethnic USSR after the transition to democracy in 1991 was not followed by the
disintegration of the multi-ethnic Russian Federation (Hale 2005; Hale & Taagepera
2002; Lapidus & Walker 1995; Treisman 1997). There are no conclusive answers, but it
seems that the Russian Federation diﬀers in some important economic, political and
ethnic respects from the former USSR and that these diﬀerences have kept the Russian
Federation intact (Hale 2005). First, the ethnic minority regions in the Russian
Federation were and are less economically developed and more dependent on subsidies
from the federation than were the Union Republics during the Soviet era. Therefore
loyalty can be better rewarded and regional co-operation better undermined by
economic sanctions (Hale & Taagepera 2002; Treisman 1997). Second, the
geographical embeddedness and restricted political status of the autonomous republics
reduces their ability to become independent. In comparison to the Union Republics,
only a few of the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation have foreign
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borders and they have fewer formal rights. Moreover, while civic and ethnic
nationalists in the Union Republics combined against the communist Soviet Union,
ethnic nationalism is not a signiﬁcant source of separatism in most of the autonomous
republics (Lapidus & Walker 1995). Third, the size of the minority populations in the
Russian Federation is substantially smaller than those of the USSR and there is no
‘ethnic core’ region that can start the disintegration of the Russian Federation in the
same way as the Russian Federation did in the USSR (Hale 2005). In contrast to the
USSR, the ‘Russian core’ of the Russian Federation is divided into 57 Russian-
dominated oblasti and okrugs—as well as 32 ethnic minority regions, of which 21 have
the status of autonomous republics and only ﬁve have a majority of non-Russian
ethnic populations (Hale 2005; Lapidus 1999). Hale (2005) considers the division of
the Russian core into oblasti to be the decisive factor preventing the disintegration of
the Russian Federation.
Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that the stability of the Russian Federation is
certain—it was obviously fragile in the ﬁrst phase of its existence as an independent
state. It would also be inaccurate to conclude that separatism has been absent. Rather,
in some ways it was stimulated: in 1991, in order to acquire the support of the non-
Russian ethnic republics for the secession of the Russian Federation from the Soviet
Union, Boris Yel’tsin called on the republics to take ‘as much autonomy as you can
swallow’ (Kahn 2002, p. 70). As a consequence a cascade of declarations of
sovereignty of ethnic republics followed. Thereby the existence of autonomous ethnic
republics as the oﬃcial homelands of the non-Russian peoples (called ‘titulars’)
became the legacy of the USSR to the Russian Federation.
The top-down suggestion to strengthen their independence stimulated the regional
elites to explore the limits of autonomy. From 1992 to 2001 regional elites signed 42
bilateral treaties and about 200 related agreements with the federal central
government—the ﬁve most important being those of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
Buryatia, Sakha-Yakutia and Tuva. In this way, the regional elites established control
over regional economic assets and, covertly, enhanced the privileged status of the
titulars in the ethnic republics (Gorenburg 1999; see also Tishkov 1997, pp. 55 and
242). Remarkably, these declarations of sovereignty were initially issued without
explicitly demanding support from the regional population(s) and there is no evidence
for a strong initial bottom-up ethnic minority demand for autonomy across ethnic
republics. However, it is not unlikely that the elite’s attempts to enlarge regional
autonomy, including outright separatism in some republics, itself became a mobilising
factor enhancing popular support for separatism. Our aim in this article is to
determine whether this is the case and which other factors contribute to popular
support for separatism in (at least some) autonomous ethnic republics in the Russian
Federation. We will not only examine the support for separatism of non-Russian
ethnic groups—as is often done—but also the way in which Russians in the republics
react to separatism. For this reason we focus on a set of factors, the eﬀects of which
may be completely diﬀerent for titulars and Russians, namely their evaluation of the
out-group and the inter-group relations in the republics. We believe that ethnic
antagonism is an important factor driving the support for separatism among titular
groups, but not among Russians. We also believe that support for separatism among
Russians in the ethnic republics is not absent, but that it is based on diﬀerent factors.





































Ethnic antagonism has continually plagued a number of regions of the Russian
Federation (Codagnone 1997; Stepanov 2000). Stepanov (2000) reports that 35 out of
the 89 federal subjects of the Russian Federation were ‘ethnically troubled’ in 2000,
and all ethnic republics fell under this category. However, not all ethnic conﬂicts are
between Russians and titulars. Three major areas of conﬂict are the Caucasus, the
Volga-Ural region and East Siberia. In the Caucasus, Avars in Dagestan are in conﬂict
with returning Chechens who were deported in 1944, they are in conﬂict with the
Nogai who are attempting to establish their own national territory, and with Kumyks
who want to establish their own national autonomy. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the
conﬂict is between Kabardins and separatist Balkars. In the Volga-Ural region, there
are tensions between Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan; there is also antagonism
between Tatars and Bashkirs in Bashkortostan and between Bashkirs and immigrating
Russians. In eastern Siberia, titulars in Tuva have been openly anti-Russian since their
annexation by the Soviet Union in 1944 and there were violent conﬂicts between them
in 1990. In Sakha-Yakutia, control over the rich resources creates tensions between
Russians and Yakuts. Stepanov (2000) found that socioeconomic factors (alienation
of rich as well as poor republics from the centre), ethnic competition and cultural
diﬀerences are the main causes of these tensions.
An important question however, is whether ethnic tensions lead to separatism
(Hagendoorn et al. 2000, p. 9). Generally it is assumed that negative inter-group
relations will stimulate separatist tendencies among the minority population (titulars).
But evidence for this relation is scarce. Second, is separatism only supported by
titulars and not by Russians in the ethnic republics? Third, what can be considered as
separatism, and what are its reliable indicators? A demand for increased autonomy
does not extend as far as a demand for complete independence. In that respect the
claims of some Caucasian republics and Tuva are clearly an expression of outright
separatism, but other ethnic republics mainly want control over their own resources
and taxes. On the other hand, more far-reaching separatist intentions can be hidden
under modest claims, and new claims can develop when previous aims have been
achieved. In republics in the Volga-Ural region with a large Muslim population, both
the aim to control resources and ethnic tensions form an uncertain mix, leading from
less to more separatism (Stepanov 2000).
The idea that economic problems and cultural diﬀerences together form the
explosive mix that ignites separatism (Stepanov 2000) is in line with the standard
explanation of nationalism (Gellner 1983, p. 62; Hooghe 1992; Horowitz 1985, pp. 258
and 263; Treisman 1997). The standard model is that economic underdevelopment and
cultural or linguistic diﬀerences block the upward social mobility of peripheral elites
and these elites then mobilise the population to support secession (Gellner 1983, p. 62).
But it is clear that the standard model does not explain all types of separatism. The
cases of Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia show that sometimes separatist movements
develop in regions that are not among the poorest (Emizet & Hesli 1995). The same
was true for the actual separations achieved by the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The
idea that economic underdevelopment rather than economic wealth is a cause of
separatism is related to modernisation theory in which it is assumed that intensiﬁed
inter-ethnic contact and higher education will erase ethnic identiﬁcations. However,
there is evidence that the opposite occurs if ethnic competition increases. In the former





































Yugoslavia, the most violent ethnic conﬂicts emerged in the republics with the highest
ethnic diversity (Hodson et al. 1994) and higher education increased the salience of
ethnic identities in the Soviet Union (Kaiser 1994, p. 235). According to the same line
of explanation, it is not unexpected that the demand for independence arose ﬁrst in
the most resourceful Union Republics of the Soviet Union and not in the poorest
(Emizet & Hesli 1995; Roeder 1991). Moreover, the high economic productivity and
strong exporting power of the republics are the best predictors of separatist activism
among leaders of the ethnic republics in the Russian Federation (Hale 2000; Treisman
1997). Hence, one important (instrumental) motive for separatism—kept outside the
box of the standard explanation of nationalism—is that regional elites want to
preserve local wealth for their own region and thereby place themselves in a stronger
position of power (Roeder 1991). It is plausible that ethnic elites in the Russian
Federation would ﬁnd support among the titular population for this aim, but is it so
implausible that Russians would also support it?
The path-breaking studies of Treisman (1997) and Hale (2000) show that the
preservation of regional wealth is a motive for the separatism of regional elites in the
Russian Federation. Treisman (1997) measured elite separatism by claims for greater
autonomy up to outright independence, acknowledging that claims for autonomy may
be reinforced by threats of independence and that the goal of independence may be
hidden under claims for autonomy. Nine indicators of political – legal separatism from
1990 to 1994 form one index of separatist elite activism. The highest scores for
separatist activity were measured for Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha-
Yakutia. Separatist activity was regressed on a number of predictors in order to
understand its reasons. It appeared that the status of the autonomous republic (rather
than other administrative units), the presence of a Muslim titular group, a nationalist
ethnic-minority leader as president of the parliament, and a high level of exports and
regional economic resources are the main predictors of elite separatist activity.
Separatism was suppressed in regions with past ethnic violence and a long tradition of
organised nationalism. Hale (2000), following a prior study by Emizet and Hesli
(1995), found similar results. His index of elite separatism was the diﬀerence in time
between the ﬁrst and the following declarations of sovereignty of ethnic republics in
the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, on the assumption that the most eager
secessionists would have declared their sovereignty earlier. The results showed that the
economic wealth of the republic (measured by retail commodity turnover per capita),
the lack of assimilation of the titular group (measured by titular language use in the
Soviet Census of 1989), and previous autonomy and separatism in adjacent regions are
the main predictors of elite separatist activity (Hale 2000).
Two factors explaining separatism stand out in the research by Treisman (1997) and
Hale (2000): economic wealth and ethnic antagonism. Both studies ﬁnd that economic
wealth promotes separatist elite activity. Hale (2000) adds that ethnic-religious
diﬀerence and activism contribute to separatism and Treisman (1997) ﬁnds that past
ethnic conﬂict reduces separatism. In any case ethnic diﬀerence plays a role in elite
separatist activity. Does this mean that regional elites mix economic reasons and
ethnic minority dominance claims in their separatist activity? Gorenburg’s (1999) in-
depth study of elite rhetoric and programmes in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvasia
and Khakassia suggests that this is true, but the ethnic revival aims are not clearly





































stated. It appears that the leaders of ethnic republics actually de-emphasised the ethnic
revival aspects of their separatist claims while focusing on the economic advantages of
sovereignty. But simultaneously they quietly adopted laws and programmes granting
the titular ethnic groups legal privileges, promoting the ethnic culture and language,
expanding native-language schooling, promoting ethnic symbols and oﬀering
members of titular ethnic groups preferential access to top administrative positions
(Gorenburg 1999).
It is likely that such ethnic revival policies increased ethnic awareness among the
titular populations and among Russians in the ethnic regions, although regional
leaders may not have had the intention of alienating their Russian inhabitants
(Gorenburg 1999). It was part of standard Soviet policy that speciﬁc ethnic policies
were allowed in ethnic regions. The expansion of these policies, however, might project
an image of inter-group relations in which titulars are gaining and Russians are losing
by increasing autonomy.
Inter-group relations
From an inter-group relations point of view it is very likely that the way in which
Russians and titulars in the ethnic republics perceive and evaluate each other aﬀects
their support or rejection of separatism. However, the evidence pertaining to this eﬀect
is limited. In a study of minority nationalism based on the Colton –Hough survey
among 15 titular groups in 13 ethnic republics in 1993, Gorenburg (2001) found that
support for regional separatism was predicted by age, (male) gender, higher education,
elite membership, (ethnic) migration, and Muslim or Buddhist religion, which are
largely the same factors as found by Hale (2000) and Treisman (1997) for elite
separatist activism. There is, to our knowledge, no evidence on the degree of support
for separatism among the Russian inhabitants of the ethnic republics and on how
mutual inter-group perceptions aﬀect support for separatism among titulars and
Russians.
A reason why titulars and Russians may diﬀer in their support for separatism is that
their deﬁnition of the boundaries of the in-group may be associated with what they
consider their home territory. The deﬁnition of group boundaries is important because
in general co-operation diminishes and trust declines beyond the boundaries of the in-
group as is argued in the classic inter-group studies of Tajfel (1982). Brewer (1999)
shows that this social diﬀerentiation implies less positive, although not necessarily
completely negative, out-group evaluations. Titulars have reasons to deﬁne their in-
group restrictively. Historically they are justiﬁed in considering themselves the
legitimate dominant group of the republic; after all, according to the Soviet legacy they
are the ‘owners’ of the ethnic republic that is named after them. In balancing their
needs for inclusion (co-operation and trust) and diﬀerentiation, optimal titular
distinctiveness is achieved by identifying with the titular group and simultaneously
with the ethnic republic (Brewer 1999). Minescu et al. (2008) found evidence for this
eﬀect across 10 ethnic republics in the Russian Federation, but for Russians in the
ethnic republics optimal distinctiveness includes the Russian Federation (Minescu
et al. 2008). This is partially due to a civic rather than an ethnic criterion of inclusion,
namely their belonging as Russians to the Russian Federation or the former Soviet





































Union (Hale 2005). Evidence for this type of association between the ethnic Russian
and civic (federal or Soviet) identity is also found in the former Union Republics
(Hagendoorn et al. 2001, p. 40). Only a minor proportion of Russians in ethnic
republics is found to combine a Russian with a titular or republican identiﬁcation
(Poppe & Hagendoorn 2001), and mainly only those Russians married to a non-
Russian partner or being able to speak the titular language (Poppe & Hagendoorn
2003). The association of Russian identity with titulars and the titular republic is easily
destroyed by economic and political competition between the two groups (Poppe &
Hagendoorn 2003). Therefore it is to be expected that titular in-group identiﬁcation
entails a claim to ‘ownership’ of the republic and thus stimulates support for
separatism. Russian in-group identiﬁcation, in contrast, extends to the Russian
Federation, the ethnic republics being part of it, and therefore triggers opposition to
separatism.
A second reason why titulars and Russians may diﬀer in their reaction to separatism
is related to how they can cope with the consequences of economic and political
competition between the two groups. Theory and extensive research on group conﬂict
make clear that inter-group competition over scarce resources—including status,
power and privileges—leads to negative inter-group evaluations and inter-group
hostility (Bobo 1999; Bobo & Hutchings 1996; Blumer 1958; Sherif 1967). This
evidence extends to inter-group conﬂict in the former Soviet Union (Hagendoorn et al.
2001, pp. 84 and 118; Hagendoorn & Poppe 2004; Poppe & Hagendoorn 2004). The
question then arises of how the eﬀects of ethnic competition aﬀect support for
separatism among Russians and titulars. We expect that titulars will consider the
exclusion of Russian as an eﬀective strategy to cope with ethnic competition, while
Russians will consider watering down titular competition and maintaining external
protection of the position of Russians more eﬀective. Autonomy allows the titulars to
control the labour market and political system in the republic and to exclude Russians.
Russians, in contrast, will seek to be protected against titular competition by
maintaining the ethnic republics under the control of federal regulations and therefore
they will oppose separatism.
A third inter-group factor that will have the opposite eﬀect on the support for
separatism among titulars and Russians is the negative view of the out-group. Social
identity theory generally predicts that any social categorisation will imply a social
comparison process that tends to lead to a more positive evaluation of the in-group
than of out-groups (Tajfel 1981, 1982). The evidence for this tendency is over-
whelming, as is shown in the overview by Ellemers et al. (1999). The inter-group
evaluations are captured in out-group stereotypes which can be less or more negative
but generally are less positive than the in-group stereotype. They comprise the
perceived discrepancies between in-group and out-group competence and morality and
thus diagnose the cooperativeness and trustworthiness of out-group members
(Phalet & Poppe 1997; Fiske 2000). When Russians and titulars evaluate each other
negatively in the context of the ethnic republics, titular groups have only a limited
number of allies to protect themselves against rejection by Russians, namely other
non-Russian ethnic groups in the republic. By enlarging the autonomy of the republic,
titulars secure their status and position in another way, namely by becoming the
dominant group. In contrast, Russians lose status and position if they are no longer





































the representatives of the dominant group of the federation in the republic. Hence,
negative out-group evaluations may lead titulars to support separatism, while they
lead Russians to oppose separatism. Even more so, Russians may only support
separatism in the ethnic republic if they trust titulars and can co-operate with them, in
other words when they evaluate titulars in a positive way.
Finally, group size has diﬀerent consequences for Russians and titulars. Group size
is an important determinant of group position (Horowitz 1985, p. 194) and it is a
multiplier of the resources that groups have to maintain their power (Blalock 1967,
p. 113; 1982, p. 106). A larger out-group is for titulars a larger threat to their status,
position and power than for Russians, because the power of titulars is restricted to the
titular republic. A Russian majority can outvote policies aimed at maintaining or
enlarging the prerogatives of the titular group. Extended autonomy or independence
puts a halt to this. Therefore a larger out-group size will stimulate titulars to endorse
separatism and ensure their domination of the republic. In contrast, a larger size of the
titular group will be a reason for Russians to oppose separatism, because their position
can only be maintained through federal control. Hence, we expect that a larger size of
the out-group reinforces titular support for separatism, while it reduces Russians’
support for separatism.
Common reasons to support separatism
It should be stressed that titulars and Russians also have common reasons to support
separatism because it oﬀers them common rewards. The most important of these
rewards is the maintenance or increase of the wealth of the republic and this may be a
major reason for titulars and Russians to support separatism in republics which are
rich in resources and produce a large gross regional product (Hale 2000; Kahn 2002,
p. 161; Treisman 1997). As a rule, wealthier republics (should) contribute more to the
budget of the federation, while poor republics receive subsidies through federal
redistribution. If separatism is presented as a means to increase retained wealth, both
Russians and titulars may be mobilised to support separatism. The general aspect of
this reason to support separatism is to maintain or enlarge economic prosperity. On
the one hand prosperity is indexed by the actual gross regional product and on the
other hand it is indexed by the experience of actual or future prosperity, as expressed
in the level of employment and in optimism about the economy and personal
economic opportunities. A concomitant political – economic aspect of prosperity is the
required or actual share of the republic’s budget transferred as taxation to the
federation. Conversely, economic underdevelopment, high unemployment, a climate
of economic pessimism, and economic dependence on the federation may be reasons
for both titulars and Russians to oppose separatism.
In addition to these economic reasons to support separatism, titulars and Russians
may have political reasons to support or oppose separatism. One reason to oppose it is
that separatism may trigger counter-measures from the government of the Russian
Federation that may hurt both Russians and titulars, including political pressure in the
form of economic sanctions and the threat of military intervention. The more likely
titulars and Russians estimate that the Federal government will interfere, the more
they will oppose separatism. A second factor is that both Russians and titulars have





































become acquainted with increased autonomy for the republics and have been
mobilised to support further separatist policies by the success of past elite separatist
action. This eﬀect may be stronger for titulars than Russians in republics where
increased autonomy implies an expansion of ethnic-revival policies (Gorenburg 1999).
The present study
We will test the diﬀerential eﬀect of inter-group factors and political – economic
factors on the support of separatism among Russian and titular groups in 10 ethnic
republics of the Russian Federation. Our main question is whether inter-group factors
divide, while political and economic factors unite titulars and Russians in their
support for regional separatism. Speciﬁcally, our hypotheses are: (1) in-group
identiﬁcation will strengthen support for separatism among titulars, but will reduce
support for separatism among Russians; (2) perceived ethnic competition will
strengthen the support of titulars for separatism, but will reduce the support for
separatism among Russians; (3) negative out-group evaluations will strengthen the
support of titulars for separatism, but will reduce the support for separatism among
Russians; (4) a larger size of the out-group will strengthen the support of titulars for
separatism, but will reduce the support for separatism among Russians; (5) in
republics with better economic conditions both Russians and titulars are more
supportive of separatism than in republics where these conditions are less positive; (6)
the estimated likelihood that the Russian Federation will sanction separatism reduces
support for separatism among Russians and titulars; and (7) previous elite activism




We use survey data collected among Russians and titulars in 10 autonomous ethnic
republics of the Russian Federation in 1999 and 2000: Karelia, Komi, Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Adygea, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha-Yakutia
and Tuva. We selected republics varying in their numerical proportion of titulars and
Russians, and diﬀering on economic criteria.
The survey was carried out in randomly selected urban areas with at least 10% of
Russian residents of the republics (in total 41 cities, including the capital). Streets in
the cities were selected by a random-route procedure and house numbers were
randomly selected. The resident with the birthday closest to the day of the interview
was invited to participate in the survey. By this approach the refusal percentage was
kept at a minimum level (3% refused). At least 450 Russians and 450 titulars in each of
the 10 republics participated. In total 9,936 respondents were interviewed of which
5,233 identiﬁed themselves as Russians and 4,703 as titulars. Respondents were coded
in the data set as Russian or titular when their personal group identiﬁcation matched
their passport nationality. Of the respondents, 44.2% are male and 55.8% are female.
Ages range between 16 and 98 years with a mean of 40.8 years.






































Separatism was measured by two statements on separation from the Russian
Federation: ‘The republic should become fully independent from Russia’ and ‘The
republic should join a regional union with states or republics similar in culture or
religion to ours’. Both statements express or imply separation from the Russian
Federation. Respondents agreed or disagreed on a ﬁve-point Likert-scale format from
‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’. The correlation between the responses to
the two statements across all republics is 0.60. The Cronbach’s alpha of the scale is
0.70 for titulars and 0.74 for Russians. A mean separatism score was computed and
normalised to scores from 0.00 to 1.00. A number of relevant predictors were used to
test the hypotheses. Two of them, education and age, were measured to control for
them in the eﬀects of the other predictors. Education was measured as high, middle or
low, and age was indicated in years.
The inter-group factors of ethnic identiﬁcation, economic and political competition,
negative out-group evaluations and out-group size were measured as follows. Ethnic
identiﬁcation among Russians was measured by two statements with a ﬁve-point
Likert-scale format from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’: ‘It is of great
importance for me to be a Russian’ and ‘I am proud to be a Russian’. The two items
correlate 0.73, and the Cronbach’s alpha of the scale is 0.84. A mean score was
computed. For titulars ethnic identiﬁcation was measured by reactions to the
statements: ‘It is of great importance for me to be regarded as a fellow [titular] person
by the [titulars]’ and ‘I am proud to be regarded as a [titular] person’. The name of the
titular group was speciﬁed in the question. The two items correlate 0.77, and the
Cronbach’s alpha of the scale is 0.91. Language assimilation (ﬂuency in speaking
the out-group language) was used as a (negative) measure of ethnic identiﬁcation.
However, in the analysis the (negative) eﬀect of language assimilation on separatism
was much weaker in comparison to the eﬀect of ethnic identiﬁcation for titulars, and
had no eﬀect for Russians. Therefore language assimilation has not been included in
the following discussion of the analysis.
Economic and political competition was measured by six statements with ﬁve-point
Likert-scales from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’ in which the target
in[-group] and/or out[-group] was speciﬁed: ‘The political interests of the [titular/
Russian] population in the republic are in conﬂict with those of the [Russians/titulars]
in this republic’; ‘The economic interests of the [titular/Russian] population in the
republic are in conﬂict with those of the [Russians/titulars] in this republic’; ‘The
[titular/Russian] people have better job opportunities than the [Russians/titulars]’;
‘The [titular/Russian] people want to exploit the [Russian/titular] labour force for its
own beneﬁt’; ‘The [titular/Russian] people want to exploit the republic’s natural
resources for its own beneﬁt’. We also included a further measure of the attributed
ambition of the out-group to have political control over the republic (with ﬁve
answering categories from ‘do not strive for political inﬂuence’ to ‘strive for absolute
political power’). The responses to the items are strongly intercorrelated: the
Cronbach’s alpha of the competition scale is 0.80 for Russians as well as for titulars.
Negative out-group evaluations were measured by eight stereotype attributions in
percentages (Brigham 1971). The stereotypes were selected on the basis of previous





































research (Hagendoorn et al. 2001; Phalet & Poppe 1997). Russians in the republic are
the out-group for titular respondents and the titular group of the republic is the out-
group for Russian respondents: for instance ‘Tatars’ in Tatarstan or ‘Tuvans’ in Tuva.
The traits peacefulness, hostility, honesty, deceitfulness, smartness, rudeness, initiative
and laziness were successively attributed on scales from 0% to 100% following the
question: ‘How many people of [group X] in this republic in your opinion have the
following characteristic?’ In principal component analysis the traits load either highly
positive (positively formulated traits) or highly negative (negative traits) on the ﬁrst
un-rotated factor, with the exception of ‘taking initiative’—which has a load close to
zero. A mean score of the negative and reversed positive attributions was computed,
excluding ‘taking initiative’. The Cronbach’s alpha of the negative out-group
stereotypes scale is 0.83 for Russians and 0.76 for titulars.
We considered two measures of out-group size. The ﬁrst is the percentage of the out-
group in the population of the republic as indicated in the 1989 Census (McAuley
1991). The second is the percentage of the out-group in the population of the republic
in the 2002 All-Russian Census (Goskomstat 2002). The ﬁrst measure of out-group
size precedes our survey of support for separatism by 10 years, while the second census
was carried out two years after our survey in 1999/2000. We believe that the preceding
measure of out-group size will more likely have a causal eﬀect on the development of
support for separatism than the measure indicating the numerical relations two years
later, but we will report the eﬀect of both measures of out-group size.
The relevant political and economic predictors were measured as follows. The
expectation that Moscow will exert pressure to prevent separatism of the republic was
measured by the question: ‘If the republic decides to become independent, what steps
do you think the Centre will take?’ The likelihood of putting the republic under
political pressure, establishing an economic blockade, or using military force had to be
estimated separately. The scale was from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The Centre
pressure scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64 for Russians and 0.68 for titulars. The
mean of the three estimations was computed.
For elite activism we used the measure of Treisman (1997), which includes nine
indicators of political – legal separatism in the years 1990 – 1994 (declaration of
sovereignty, claim of higher administrative status, own constitution, precedence
of regional over federal law or constitution, referendum on sovereignty, boycott of
federal election, declaration of independence, refusal to send conscripts, and
independent foreign policy). A second indicator of elite activism used by Hale
(2000) and Kahn (2002, p. 104) is the (lower) number of weeks after which the republic
followed the declaration of sovereignty of Estonia. It appeared that this measure is
collinear with a number of other predictors of separatism. This is also true for
Treisman’s (1997) measure, but to a much lesser degree.
Several measures were used for economic prosperity of the republic. The ﬁrst was
economic optimism, measured by four statements on the economic situation of the
republic and of the respondent in the last two years and the next two years. The
statements form one scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75. The second was Gross
Regional Product (GRP) in 1998 (Goskomstat 1999). An alternative for the GRP,
taking better account of the consequences of the economy for the population, is the
percentage unemployed for the republic in 1998 (Statistical Yearbook Goskomstat





































1999, pp. 108 – 13). Another index of wealth of the republic is the tax transfer to the
Russian Federation in 1995 (McAuley 1997) indicating the diﬀerence between tax paid
by the republic and subsidies received by the republic. Because the two measures of
elite activism and the last three measures of economic prosperity are alternatives, it
was to be expected that they are collinear among themselves or with other predictors.
This appeared to be true. Therefore the predictors of elite activism and economic
prosperity were entered in separate regression models. The values for elite activism
and the economic predictors are presented in Table 1 and Appendix A. All variables in
the regression models were normalised to a score ranging from 0 to 1.
Results
Support for separatism
Titulars support separatism signiﬁcantly more (M¼ 0.50) than Russians (M¼ 0.28).
Titular support for separatism is strongest in Tuva (0.58), Sakha (0.57), Tatarstan
(0.57), Bashkortostan (0.57) and Adygea (0.53) and weakest in Dagestan (0.25), as can
be seen in Table 2. Among Russians, support for separatism is strongest in Karelia
(0.45), Sakha (0.42), Bashkortostan (0.39) and Udmurtia (0.39) and weakest in
Dagestan (0.07) and Kabardino-Balkaria (0.08). There is a large discrepancy between
the support for separatism of titulars (strong) and Russians (weak) in Tuva: 49.5% of
titular respondents score above the mid-point (0.50) of the scale, while only 7.8% of
Russians do so. The same discrepancy is present in Adygea (44% against 5%) and, to
a lesser degree, in Kabardino-Balkaria (31% against 4%). This shows that support for
separatism in Tuva, Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria comes primarily from titulars.
TABLE 1
GROUP SIZE AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 10 REPUBLICS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Republics % Titulars % Russians Elite activism Tax transfer Gross regional product
European North:
Karelia 10.0 73.6 5 295 14,607
Komi 23.3 57.7 5 1,046 24,545
Volga-Urals:
Tatarstan 48.5 43.3 11 469 17,924
Bashkortostan 21.9 39.3 8 597 15,603
Udmurtia 30.9 58.9 3 469 12,233
North Caucasus:
Adygea 22.1 68.0 2 7100 7,519
Dagestan (Avars) 27.5 9.2 3 7659 4,104
Kabardino-Balk. 48.2 32.0 4 7318 8,067
Siberia:
Sakha-Yakutia 33.4 50.3 7 7295 33,426
Tuva 64.3 32.0 3 71,245 595
Sources: Percentages of titulars and Russians: McAuley (1991); elite activism: Treisman (1997); tax transfer
(tax leaving the republic and subsidies received by the republic in 1995): McAuley (1997); gross regional
product: Goskomstat (1999). Normalised size outgroup¼ (% outgroup size)/100; normalised elite activism:
(elite activism)/57; normalised tax transfer¼ (tax transferþ 1,245)/2291; normalised gross regional
product¼ (gross regional product)/33,426.





































There is more shared support for separatism among titulars and Russians in Karelia
(40% and 32%) and Sakha-Yakutia (52% and 31%). The results for the other
republics are in between these examples (see Table 2).
Negative evaluation of the inter-group relations between titulars and Russians
The Tuvans have the most negative stereotypes about Russians in their republic,
whereas the Balkars in the bi-titular republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and in particular
the Avars in the multi-titular republic of Dagestan are the least negative about
Russians (see Table 3). Dishonesty of out-group members is always the most
important attributed negative evaluation. The Russians in the republics, in return, are
the most negative about titulars in Tuva, followed by Adygea, Dagestan and
Bashkortostan. Russians are least negative about titulars in the North European
republics, Karelia and Komi, and the Volga-Ural republics Tatarstan and Udmurtia.
As can further be seen in Table 2, the titulars in Tuva and Sakha-Yakutia perceive
strong political and economic competition from Russians in their republic, while the
Avars, Tatars and Balkars perceive less competition from Russians in their republics.
The Russians, on the other hand, perceive most competition from titulars in Tuva,
followed by Adygea and Dagestan, and least in Komi and Karelia.
In sum, mutual inter-group perceptions, in terms of stereotypes and inter-group
competition, are most negative in Tuva. Russians are perceived relatively positively by
titulars in the multi-titular republics of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, but
Russians perceive the titulars in these republics less positively. In the northern
European republics of Karelia and Komi the inter-group relations seem to be most
balanced and relatively positive.
TABLE 2
SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM AMONG TITULARS AND RUSSIANS
Republics Titulars (%) M (%) Russians (%) M (%)
European North:
Karelia 0.50bc (39.6) 0.45a (32.4)
Komi 0.45cd (33.3) 0.32b (22.2)
Volga-Urals:
Tatarstan 0.57a (50.6) 0.32b (21.4)
Bashkortostan 0.57a (52.7) 0.39a (26.9)
Udmurtia 0.47bc (36.5) 0.39a (25.5)
North Caucasus:
Adygea 0.53ab (44.2) 0.12d (4.8)
Dagestan (Avars) 0.25e (13.4) 0.07a (2.1)
Kabardino-Balkaria 0.40d (30.6) 0.08d (3.8)
Siberia:
Sakha-Yakutia 0.57a (52.4) 0.42a (31.3)
Tuva 0.58a (49.5) 0.19c (7.8)
Across republics 0.50 (40.9) 0.28 (18.1)
Note: Scores are mean scores between 0.00 and 1.00 recoded from ﬁve-point scales. A higher score indicates
more support for separatism. Diﬀerent superscripts (a – e) indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between republics
(p5 0.01) as yielded by analysis of variance (Tukey’s post-hoc test). Between brackets are the percentages of
respondents agreeing above 0.50 with the separatism statements.





































Factors determining the support for separatism
Support for separatism is linearly regressed on 10 predictors. The linear models are
tested for titulars and Russians separately. The values of the predictors and the
dependent variable are normalised and standardised beta values will be presented in
order to facilitate the comparison of the eﬀects of diﬀerent predictors. The regression
models for both Russians and titulars are tested several times by replacing the
predictors of elite activism and economic prosperity with alternatives. Elite activism
and gross regional product (GRP) or their alternatives are not entered in the same
model because these predictors are collinear. Thus we end up with six models (three
for titulars and three for Russians) while testing nine models (one alternative for the
predictor of elite activism), namely the Hale (2000) index instead of the Treisman
(1997) index, and two for economic prosperity, namely unemployment and tax
transfer to the federation as alternatives of GRP. Regression model I tests the eﬀects
of the background factors, the inter-group factors, centre pressure and economic
optimism. Model II adds elite activism and model III adds gross regional product. The
results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and the eﬀects of the alternative predictors are
indicated in the legends.
Background factors
Educational level and age were entered to control for education and age eﬀects in the
regression weights of the other predictors. However, it appears that education and age
TABLE 3
NEGATIVE OUT-GROUP STEREOTYPES AND PERCEIVED COMPETITION AMONG TITULARS AND RUSSIANS
Republics
Negative stereotypes Perceived competition
Titulars Russians Titulars Russians
European North:
Karelia 0.38de 0.36e 0.32de 0.24f
Komi 0.41bcd 0.37e 0.38bc 0.25f
Volga-Urals:
Tatarstan 0.39cde 0.37e 0.24fg 0.45cd
Bashkortostan 0.43bc 0.42d 0.34cd 0.45cd
Udmurtia 0.42bc 0.37e 0.37c 0.30e
North Caucasus:
Adygea 0.43b 0.50b 0.28ef 0.52b
Dagestan (Avars) 0.30f 0.46c 0.20g 0.48bc
Kabardino-Balkaria 0.37e 0.39de 0.25f 0.45cd
Siberia:
Sakha-Yakutia 0.41bcd 0.39de 0.41b 0.42d
Tuva 0.47a 0.57a 0.48a 0.61a
Across republics 0.40 0.42 0.32 0.42
Note: Scores are mean scores between 0.00 and 1.00. For perceived competition the scores are recoded from
ﬁve-point scales. A higher score indicates more negative stereotypes or more perceived competition. Diﬀerent
superscripts (a – e) indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between republics (p5 0.01) as yielded by analysis of
variance (Tukey’s post-hoc test).





































have more eﬀect on the support for separatism among Russians than among titulars.
Older and higher educated Russians generally object to separatism, while younger
titulars seem to support it (see Table 4, model II with elite activism).
Inter-group factors
Strong ethnic identiﬁcation of titulars with their in-group signiﬁcantly strengthens
their support for separatism (see Table 4). Ethnic identiﬁcation of Russians has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on support for or objection to separatism (see Table 5). This conﬁrms
hypothesis 1 only partially. As expected, titular in-group identiﬁcation contributes to
support of separatism, but it is not true that Russian identiﬁcation strengthens
opposition to separatism. This may reﬂect the fact that Russian identiﬁcation is more
civic than ethnic and includes non-Russians as citizens of Russia (Hale 2005).
Alternatively, Russian ethnic identiﬁcation may be more limited and rather captures
attachment to the Russian-speaking groups in the republic (Laitin 1998, p. 299).
The eﬀect of perceived economic and political competition on support for
separatism is signiﬁcant among titulars and Russians. However, while the perception
of competition is the strongest predictor of support for separatism among titulars,
TABLE 4
PREDICTORS OF TITULAR’S SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM
Model I II III
Background factors
Age 70.04 70.06 70.04
Education 70.01 70.03 70.03
Intergroup factors
Ethnic identiﬁcation 0.14 0.16 0.15
Economic & political competition 0.22 0.24 0.21
Negative out-group stereotypes 0.12 0.11 0.12
Size out-group (in 1989)a 0.13 0.15 0.09
Political factors
Centre: preventive pressure 0.01 0.04 0.02
Elite activismb 0.22
Economic factors
Economic optimism 0.06 0.07 0.07
Gross regional productc 0.13
Model R2 0.14 0.19 0.15
R2 change inter-group factorsd 0.13
Notes: Values represent standardised beta values; eﬀects with a signiﬁcance of p5 0.01 are printed in bold.
aThe eﬀect of the measure of out-group size based on the 2002 Census is almost the same as that of the 1989
Census (Beta coeﬃcient of out-group size in 2002 is 0.12 in model I, 0.13 in Model II and 0.07 in Model III);
the coeﬃcients of the other variables remained the same.
bThe index is based on Treisman (1997). An alternative index for elite activism is the number of weeks after
which the republic followed Estonia in declaring sovereignty (Hale 2000). The beta of this index (reversed) is
0.16; the Model R2 is 0.15.
cUnemployment in the republic in percentages of the active population in 1998 (Goskomstat 1999) as an
alternative economic predictor has a beta of70.29; the Model R2 is 0.19; tax transfer to the federation as an
alternative predictor has a beta of 0.10; the Model R2 is 0.15.
dF change¼ 146.28. p5 0.001.





































among Russians it is an important predictor of objection to separatism. The eﬀects of
negative out-group stereotypes and a larger out-group size are largely the same:
negative stereotypes about Russians and a larger size of the Russian out-group are
reasons to support separatism for titulars, but negative stereotypes about titulars and
a larger size of the titular group are reasons to oppose separatism for Russians. This
conﬁrms the expectations in hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. This shows that negative inter-
group relations, expressed in a strong identiﬁcation with the ethnic in-group combined
with a negative judgment of the Russian out-group and framed by a competitive
relation between the two groups—and more strongly so if the Russian group is larger
in size—motivates titulars to support policies attempting to withdraw the ethnic
republic from the Russian Federation. Russians may have other reasons to agree with
separatism, but not this one. Russians support separatism more if the inter-group
relations are positive: if there is no competition but co-operation; if they positively
evaluate titulars, although this is less relevant if the republic is already more
autonomous and the gross domestic product is large; (see the eﬀect of stereotypes in
model II and III in Table 5) and if the titular group is not large in size. It seems that
TABLE 5
PREDICTORS OF RUSSIAN’S SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM
Model I II III
Background factors
Age 70.08 70.09 70.06
Education 70.12 70.12 70.12
Intergroup factors
Ethnic identiﬁcation 70.01 0.00 0.02
Economic & political competition 70.08 70.08 70.06
Negative out-group stereotypes 70.08 70.03 70.04
Size out-group (in 1989)a 70.13 70.17 70.10
Political factors
Centre: preventive pressure 70.04 70.01 70.03
Elite activismb 0.21
Economic factors
Economic optimism 0.13 0.10 0.11
Gross regional productc 0.25
Model R2 0.09 0.13 0.14
R2 change inter-group factorsd 0.04
Notes: Values represent standardised beta values; eﬀects with a signiﬁcance of p5 0.01 are printed in bold.
aThe eﬀect of the measure of out-group size based on the 2002 Census is weaker (B¼70.07) in model I than
that of the 1989 census; in model II the eﬀect of out-group size in 2002 is70.11 and in model III70.05. This
suggests that out-group size in 1989 has a formative eﬀect on support for separatism among Russians in 1999/
2000. Out-group size in 2002 diﬀers from out-group size in 1989 only by slightly higher percentages of titulars
in all republics, except for Tuva where the percentages of titulars increased to 77% and in Dagestan where the
percentage of Avars decreased to 19%.
bThe index is based on Treisman (1997). An alternative index for elite activism is the number of weeks after
which the republic followed Estonia in declaring sovereignty (Hale 2000). The beta of this index (reversed) is
0.34; the Model R2 is 0.19.
cUnemployment in the republic in percentages of the active population in 1998 (Goskomstat 1999) as an
alternative economic predictor has a beta of70.26; the Model R2 is 0.15; tax transfer to the federation as an
alternative predictor has a beta of 0.19; the Model R2 is 0.11.
dF change¼ 44.39. p5 0.001.





































Russians fear anti-Russian separatism among titulars and are opposed to it. At face
value it seems paradoxical that, if their in-group is smaller, titulars support separatism
more, while Russians oppose separatism more. But the underlying reason may be the
same, namely fear of ethnic domination. Titulars escape from ethnic domination by
founding an independent titular republic, while Russians escape from it by keeping the
republic in the federation.
Political factors
The estimated likelihood that the Russian Federation will sanction separatism by
putting political pressure on the republic, by establishing an economic blockade, or by
using military force, has no eﬀect on the support for separatism among titulars. This is
not what was expected in hypothesis 5. Similarly, the expectation of federal sanctions
of separatism also does not strongly prevent Russians from supporting separatism,
especially not when elites actively pursued separatism and when the republic is
economically prosperous (see models II and III in Table 5).
More spectacular is the eﬀect of elite activism. The eﬀect of elite activism is positive
for titulars as well as for Russians, which means that both groups support separatism
more if political elites more eagerly pursued autonomy or independence of the republic.
In other words, the elite separatist activity mobilised the populations of the republics to
support separatism, as was expected in hypothesis 6. The eﬀect of elite activism is the
strongest predictor of support for separatism among Russians and one of the strongest
among titulars. Interestingly, when the index of Hale (2000) is used in the model, the
regression weight becomes substantially higher among Russians (see table legend for
Table 5) and smaller among titulars (see Table 4). This diﬀerence in the eﬀect of the two
indices suggests that the political content of the activity of the elites—prominent in the
measure of Treisman (1997)—mobilised the titulars in particular, while the mobilisa-
tion of Russians is a positive accommodation to the earlier establishment—what Hale
(2000) measures—of more autonomy as a fait accompli.
Economic factors
Economic optimism signiﬁcantly strengthens support for separatism among titulars
and Russians. The standardised beta value is higher among Russians than among
titulars and this shows that Russians especially are not reluctant to support separatism
if this may be economically advantageous. This conﬁrms hypothesis 6. Even more
convincing is the eﬀect of a larger GDP. A larger GDP is for both groups a reason to
support separatism and the eﬀect is stronger than that of economic optimism, and
again much stronger among Russians. If GDP is replaced by unemployment (in the
year 1998) then the diﬀerences between the groups are less prominent; the eﬀect on
separatism is for both groups signiﬁcant and negative (see table legends of Tables 4
and 5). Replacement of GDP by tax transfer to the federation has a positive but
somewhat weaker eﬀect on the support of separatism for both groups (see table
legends of Tables 4 and 5). All economic predictors conﬁrm what was expected in
hypothesis 7: if separatism may have positive economic consequences for the
population then both Russians and titulars ﬁnd each other supporting it.






































The hypotheses are largely conﬁrmed. Inter-group factors stimulate support for
separatism among titulars in particular. Political and economic factors stimulate
support for separatism among both Russians and titulars. Three factors did not aﬀect
support for separatism as we expected: ethnic identiﬁcation did not aﬀect support for
separatism among Russians; the expected likelihood that the centre would try to
prevent separatism by interventions did not really deter titulars or Russians to support
separatism; and negative stereotypes about titulars do not always prevent Russians
from opposing separatism, particularly not if elite activism was stronger and if the
republic is prosperous.
The general linear model explains more of titulars’ support for separatism than of
Russians’ support for separatism (the model R-square is a maximum of 0.18 and 0.21,
respectively). The contribution of the inter-group factors to the model is large for
titulars and substantial for Russians (the R-square change is 0.08 and 0.05,
respectively). The fact that the inter-group factors have this eﬀect in diﬀerent
directions for titulars and Russians is a crucial ﬁnding. However, for both groups the
total amount of explained variance is modest. The power of the model might have
improved if the nested structure of the republican-level and individual-level predictors
could have been taken into account by multi-level analysis, but the number of
republics was too small to justify this analysis (Cheung & Au 2005, p. 612).
Discussion
It was an irony of history that the leader destined to carry the Russian Federation out
of the collapsing Soviet colossus in 1991 needed the same support from the ethnic
republics as Lenin did 70 years earlier. He had to conﬁrm and even enlarge their
autonomy. The idea of autonomous ethnic republics contributed in important ways to
the emancipation of the non-Russian peoples in Russia—in spite of the fact that the
autonomy never carried much weight in the Soviet period. However, the reality of the
ethnic republics did not bring an unqualiﬁed contribution to the stability and unity of
the Russian Federation, certainly not directly after its independence. One of the
reasons for this is that titulars share their ethnic territory with Russians and that the
Russians are the majority in a substantial number of republics. Nonetheless, titulars
were shown to be able to aﬃrm their own language and culture in most republics. This
was reinforced by the ‘parade of sovereignties’.
Titulars, perceiving the republic as ‘theirs’, have two important reasons to claim
sovereignty and make their republic as independent as possible from the Russian
Federation. The ﬁrst reason is mundane, and the second reason may be based on
prejudice. Titular groups may come to see separatism as an easy way to increase the
wealth of the republic if it is prosperous and subsidising the Russian Federation
through taxation. If titulars have, in addition, reasons to see the Russians in their
republic as competitors and the Russian Federation as exploitative, they would
simultaneously rule out their ‘internal competitor’ and their ‘external sovereign’ by
separation. Some scholars argue that such perceptions of competition and external
domination are not realistic, because the Russian core of the federation is divided





































(Hale 2005). But others wonder why the Russian Federation has been so eager to
reduce or even destroy the power of the ethnic republics since 2000 (Melvin 2005, p.
209). Was it because Russians in some cases shared the support for separatism among
titulars? Titulars support separatism for two reasons: negative inter-group relations
with Russians in the republic and the prospect of becoming more prosperous, whereas
Russians have only one reason: the prospect of becoming more prosperous. Hence, a
united front closes in favour of separatism if the actions of Russians and titulars are
both inﬂuenced by the economic returns of the republic.
One of the ﬁndings of this research is that not only the minority position but also
the majority position may lead to separatism. This deﬁes the traditional logic of
nationalism and mainstream theory of inter-group relations. The traditional scenario
is that a minority group is discriminated against, learns to loathe the dominant
majority group (Tajfel 1982) and wants to liberate itself by separating from the nation
of the majority (Gellner 1983, p. 62; Horowitz 1985, p. 264). But the political logic of
the inter-group relations in a federation with ethnic republics is more complex. First,
separatism is not only typical of minorities but also of majorities. Second, separatism
is not always motivated by negative out-group evaluations; only among titular groups
did perceived competition and negative attitudes towards Russians provoke
separatism. Third, the economic rationale of keeping the republic’s wealth motivates
both Russians and titulars to support separatism. These points qualify the traditional
logic of nationalism.
The ﬁndings show that the conditions structuring the relations between the two
groups determine the political consequences of inter-group antagonism. An
asymmetrical dynamic of popular support for separatism results from relative group
size and the ethnic foundation of the political-administrative structure: Russians care
mainly about controlling the economic wealth of the republic, while titulars are in
addition driven by ethnic claims of entitlement to the republic. The evidence for this is
that Russians reciprocate the negative evaluations of titulars, but these negative
evaluations do not motivate Russians to endorse separatism. And it is logical that
separatism is not the most obvious way for Russians to escape from ethnic
antagonism; the opposite, strengthening their position by eliminating the autonomy
of the republic, would be more to the point.
How extensive is the support for separatism in the ethnic republics? Are there ethnic
republics where the majority of the population is in favour of separatism? We should
remember that the survey was carried out in randomly selected urban areas with at
least 10% of Russian residents of the republics. Therefore the ﬁndings are not
indicative for rural areas. However, within these limits the answer for 1999/2000 is that
there was no evidence of majority support for separatism in any of the selected
republics. Maximum support is reached in Tuva where 50% of the titulars and 8% of
the Russians support separatism, followed by Tatarstan (51% and 21%) and Sakha-
Yakutia (52% and 31%). In these three republics, like in all others, titulars
proportionally outnumber Russians in support for separatism. It is only in Karelia
that the Russian support almost equals that of titulars.
The Russian supporters of separatism are across the board young, lower educated
and believe in the economic prospects of the republic. They know that the
Russian group is large enough in the republic to remain dominant and they are





































willing to co-operate with titulars. This Russian separatism seems to ﬁnd its reason in
personal and national optimism, not in resentment about the power of the titulars. The
picture for titular separatism is diﬀerent, not completely, but yet substantively.
Titulars supporting separatism are also young, but not necessarily lower educated.
They identify strongly with their ethnic group. They are also optimistic about the
economic future of the republic and want to keep a larger share of its wealth. But the
substantive diﬀerence with Russians who support separatism is the underlying
antagonism: the motivation for separatism is confrontational. It is a reaction to
Russian demographic threat, and probably a dramatic attempt to change the status
quo. But the irony of titular separatism is that the political status of the titular
republics places the titulars in a triangular relation to Russians that limits for them the
options to change the terms of the inter-group relation (Brubaker 1996, p. 76). If they
change the terms for the internal Russians, the federation may intervene, and if they
change the terms for the federation, the internal Russians may defect.
The political dynamics of the inter-group relation between titulars and Russians in
the ethnic republics shows one of the weaknesses of the multicultural Russian
Federation. The weakness lies not in the nature of its multiculturalism, but in the
territorial interpretation of it. Although it is not very likely that the popular drive
towards separatism will stimulate the political elites to really attempt to secede from
the Russian Federation, it is not surprising that the Russian Federation has
approached the issue of separatism diﬀerently since 2000. Separatist tendencies can
quickly escalate. Therefore authority was recentralised in the fragile federation by a
district redivision in which the ethnic republics are included in larger districts (Jack
2004, p. 234; Melvin 2005, p. 209).
It is not certain whether this policy will be successful. It is not very likely that it will
change the inter-group competition and negative evaluation of Russians by the titular
populations and exactly these negative conditions are a powerful predictor of titular
separatism. The federation gambles that separatism is powerless when power is
drained from the ethnic republics. But that may not drain the feelings of ethnic
entitlement of titulars to have their ‘own’ republics.
Utrecht University
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Appendix A: Political and economic characteristics of 10 republics of the Russian
Federation
TABLE A1
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 10 REPUBLICS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION











Sources: Gross regional product: McAuley (1997); elite activism: the number of weeks after which the
republic followed Estonia in declaring sovereignty (Hale 2000).
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